Weekend column, shortened version. The full story (with Aluf Benn) is here.

Abbas

On the eve of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s arrival in Washington, the Americans were hearing a new tune from the Fatah leadership in Ramallah. “He’s changed,” a close associate of the chairman said. “He has a determination that I haven’t seen before,” explained another. State Department officials chose to believe them, mainly because they had no choice.

A U.S. official admitted in a brief conversation that “the Hamas takeover of Gaza was not a positive development.” His statement was an exception to the rule, however. Most of the time the Israelis and the Americans implied that this was the best of all possible worlds, using terms like “an opportunity” and “a better future.” There was a certain degree of pretending, but their words also reflected a genuine mood. The new situation has simply introduced a degree of clarity into an unclear situation. “It has given us something to do, something to work with,” the official said. It’s easier when the world is divided into good guys and bad guys.

Olmert

In a press briefing at Blair House after his meeting with Bush, Olmert proved that he has taken on the lessons of the Winograd interim report. The committee criticized him for the detailed goals he had announced at the outset of the Second Lebanon War, which were unattainable. The collapse of his West Bank convergence plan taught him that it is easy to make declarations and hard to carry them out. The result is that Olmert is now unwilling to commit himself publicly to anything.

The frustrated journalists try to squeeze a headline out of what Olmert did not say. For example: “The prisoners are always on the agenda, and it is clear that Abu Mazen [Abbas] is not responsible for Gilad Shalit.” What does this mean? Does it mean that he will release Palestinian prisoners to Abbas without waiting for the return of the abducted Israeli soldier? And what about Marwan Barghouti? “We are not dealing at the moment with any particular prisoner.” Such vague statements leave Olmert freedom of movement, without making any promises.

Bush

Bush and Olmert conducted the most effective propaganda show possible under the present circumstances. Olmert looked as though he wanted a Palestinian state even more than the Palestinians themselves, do and Bush appeared to believe in the two-state vision even more than the Israelis and the Palestinians. But in conversations within the U.S. and Israel this week, we heard doubts that go beyond questions of timing to those of substance: Is the idea of an independent Palestinian state still valid?

Bush committed himself to this idea in his 2002 speech. But for the professionals, the analysts and the assessors, the events in Gaza afford a new window of opportunity to deal with scenarios that in ordinary times cannot even be mentioned. Words such as “confederation,” to describe a possible relationship between a West Bank Palestine and Jordan, or even “autonomy,” enjoying the trappings of nationalism without independence, are again being whispered over the water cooler. They can be viewed as part of the search for a solution, but also as a whip being held over the head of the hesitant Abbas: The Bush administration is committed to the Bush vision, but the next administration could choose another path.

Envoy

Senator Diane Feinstein of California and several Senate colleagues, including Democrats such as Christopher Dodd (Connecticut) and Republicans such as Richard Lugar (Indiana) and Chuck Hagel (Nebraska) have introduced a resolution reaffirming the Senate’s commitment to a two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The resolution requires no action on the part of the administration. Its value is as a declaration of principles.

Nevertheless, it places an interesting subject on the agenda: The president must “consider appointing a Special Envoy for Middle East Peace,” the resolution states. This is a diplomatic tool that has become a cliche, an envoy in the guise of a messiah. A senior Israeli diplomatic source suggested this week that “any Democratic administration that is elected in 2008 will appoint a special envoy for the peace process. It has become such an accepted slogan in the party that no Democratic president will be able to avoid it.” It is certainly possible that even a Republican administration will choose to appoint such an envoy, if only to head off criticism about the lack of one. Israel will have to welcome this personage warmly.